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SHORT-FORM MERGERS AFTER
GLASSMAN V. UNOCAL EXPLORATION
CORP.: TIME TO REFORM APPRAISAL
RICHARD T. HOSSFELD
INTRODUCTION
Reconciling the conflict between the doctrine of entire fairness1
and the summary process contained in Delaware’s short-form merger
2
statute, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration Corp.3 that a majority shareholder need not establish
4
entire fairness in a short-form merger. Instead, majority shareholders
can freeze out minority shareholders by simply paying them for the
“fair value” of their shares.5 Under Delaware’s new doctrine, a
dissatisfied shareholder’s only recourse, absent fraud or illegality, is
6
appraisal.
A short-form merger occurs when a parent corporation combines
7
with a 90 percent owned subsidiary. Delaware offers a statutory
summary procedure for such mergers. Under Delaware’s short-form
merger statute, a parent who owns at least 90 percent “of the
outstanding shares of each class of [a subsidiary corporation’s] stock”
may merge the subsidiary corporation into itself, or alternatively, may

Copyright © 2004 by Richard T. Hossfeld.
1. Entire fairness is a standard that majority shareholders must satisfy in self-interested
transactions, such as merger freeze-outs. Entire fairness involves two components: fair dealing
and fair price. Essentially, both the mechanics of the transaction and the buyout price must be
fair to minority shareholders. For a complete discussion of entire fairness, see infra Part I.B.
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001). A short-form merger is one where the majority
shareholder(s) owns at least 90 percent “of the outstanding shares of each class of the
[corporation’s] stock” and eliminates the minority shareholders using a statutory summary
process. Id. § 253(a).
3. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2000).
4. Id. at 248.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 243.
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a).
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merge both itself and the subsidiary corporation into a third
8
corporation. To effectuate such a merger, a parent’s board of
directors simply approves a resolution and files the resolution with
9
the Delaware secretary of state. The parent’s stockholders, the
subsidiary’s board, and the subsidiary’s stockholders do not play any
role in approving the merger or in negotiating the merger price.
In a traditional merger, shareholders of the acquired corporation
are entitled to “adequate consideration for their stock.”10 Assuring
shareholders adequate consideration are “[t]he traditional legal
11
safeguards”: shareholder approval and statutory appraisal.
12
Generally, shareholders must approve mergers. Appraisal then
guarantees dissenting shareholders the opportunity to seek a fair
price for their shares through a judicial process. Common law
fiduciary duties also provide protection.13
However, none of these traditional safeguards adequately
protect minority shareholders when the majority freezes them out in a
short-form merger. First, shareholder approval is ineffective because,
by definition, the parent holds sufficient votes to approve the merger
without any minority support.14 Even if a merger’s approval required
a majority of the minority vote, dissatisfied shareholders would only
have “the limited option of rejecting the merger,” as minority
shareholders rarely participate in merger negotiations.15 Second,
8. Id.
9. The board resolution shall provide the “terms and conditions of the merger, including
the securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued, paid, delivered or granted by the surviving
corporation” to the subsidiary. Id. Along with the board resolution, the parent must also file a
certificate showing 90 percent ownership of the subsidiary. Id.
10. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78
N.C. L. REV. 101, 102 (1999).
11. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and
Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 299 (1974).
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c).
13. Campbell, supra note 10, at 102; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the
Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions while Chilling
Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 423 (1996) (“[T]he principal purpose of fiduciary
duties has long been to constrain opportunism by management and controlling shareholders.”).
The three common law fiduciary duties are the duty of good faith, the duty of loyalty, and the
duty of due care. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995). For a
description of the common law fiduciary duties, see infra notes 26−30 and accompanying text.
14. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 11, at 299–300.
15. Id. at 300. A majority of the minority vote requires the corporation to obtain a majority
of support from the minority shareholders before it can proceed with a transaction. Id.
However, majority shareholders would likely involve minority shareholders in merger
negotiations when the minority shareholders could veto the merger.
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researchers label appraisal “a remedy of desperation” and describe it
as “technical . . . expensive . . . uncertain . . . and . . . unlikely to
produce a better result than could have been obtained on the
16
market.” Unsurprisingly, few shareholders seek appraisal even
though they might be dissatisfied with the consideration their parent
pays them in a freeze-out merger.17
Despite appraisal’s ineffectiveness, shareholders lack any other
means to fight majority overreaching in a short-form merger.18
Though Delaware “launched the modern movement toward greater
19
reliance on appraisal as a check against majority self-dealing” in
20
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., it has yet to specify an adequate appraisal
21
remedy for protecting frozen-out shareholders. As such, if Delaware
wants appraisal to remain a minority stockholder’s exclusive remedy
in a short-form merger, it should modify appraisal to protect the
minority stockholder.
Instead of merely paying minority shareholders the “fair value”
of their shares, appraisal should seek a Pareto optimal outcome and
fully compensate minority shareholders while reducing merger
transaction costs. In general, a Pareto optimal outcome exists where it
is impossible to make any party better off without harming someone
22
else. Applying Pareto concepts to appraisal reform reveals that
Delaware can reduce appraisal’s transaction costsbenefiting
minority shareholders by giving them a realistic remedy and greater
compensationwithout injuring majority shareholders. Currently,
appraisal’s high transaction costs harm both minority and majority
shareholders. Minority shareholders lack an adequate remedy in a
16. Id. at 304 (quoting Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and
Management in Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969)).
17. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, Shareholder Litigation: Reexamining the
Balance Between Litigation Agency Costs and Management Agency Costs, 28 (Sept. 4, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal); see Coffee, supra note 13, at 364
(“[A]ppraisal proceedings are an unwieldy remedy that smaller shareholders infrequently
elect . . . .”).
18. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
19. Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate
Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 43 (1995).
20. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
21. See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 616 (1998) (“Weinberger apparently was intended to
revamp the appraisal remedy so that shareholder challenges to merger transactions would be
efficiently resolved in an appraisal proceeding, rather than some other form of legal challenge to
the transaction.”).
22. ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 559 (1997).
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freeze-out and, as a result, majority shareholders pay a higher cost of
23
capital through the minority discount. Appraisal reform could lower
the parent corporation’s cost of capital if minority shareholders feel
more secure in their holdings and, through efficient markets, bargain
away the traditional minority discount.24
Part I of this Note outlines Delaware merger freeze-out law. It
first provides a general description of the relevant merger law, before
turning to entire fairness and appraisal. Part I gives a detailed account
of the procedural and valuation aspects of entire fairness review and
appraisal. Next, Part II examines the result of the Glassman holding,
which leaves appraisal as the exclusive remedy for dissatisfied
minority shareholders in a short-form merger. Although appraisal is
an adequate remedy substantively because of the similar valuation
techniques that appraisal and entire fairness employ, this Note argues
that appraisal is procedurally flawed. These procedural flaws reduce
shareholder liquidity and render minority shareholders vulnerable to
majority opportunism—two harms that appraisal is charged with
mitigating. As such, Part III provides a brief discussion of efficient
markets to show how minority shareholders discount the purchase
price of their shares to reflect the risks of illiquidity and majority
overreaching. Applying Pareto concepts, Part IV proposes both
procedural and valuation modifications to the appraisal remedy that
will provide shareholders with additional liquidity and greater
protection against majority overreaching.
I. DELAWARE FREEZE-OUT LAW
A. Overview of Delaware Merger Law
Corporations operate as democratic organizations and are
25
generally subject to majority-rule governance. Mitigating the
inherent supremacy that majority shareholders have over minority
shareholders are the majority’s fiduciary obligations to both the
parent’s minority shareholders and the shareholders of any subsidiary
23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 458 (5th ed. 1998)
(recognizing that minority shareholders who are vulnerable to a freeze-out merger will demand
extra compensation for the risk of their investment).
24. Stock trades in the open market at the minority discount price, which incorporates an
offset for the value of holding corporate control. See infra Part III.
25. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 613. Many states, however, require supermajority
governance when undertaking fundamental corporate acts. F. HODGE O’NEAL, EXPULSION OR
OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES: “SQUEEZE-OUTS” IN SMALL ENTERPRISES 5 (1961).
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26
corporation. Regardless of the relative size of each constituency,
majority shareholders “owe the same duty of good management” to
both the parent and subsidiary.27 Serving in both capacities does not
28
dilute a parent’s fiduciary obligations to its subsidiary.
Three fiduciary obligations police the parent-minority
shareholder relationship: the duty of good faith, the duty of loyalty,
29
and the duty of due care. Shareholders may, in their individual
capacities, bring derivative suits or class actions against managers
30
alleging breach of one of the triad of fiduciary duties. In a fiduciary
claim, the deferential business judgment rule has served historically as
both a procedural and substantive guide for litigants, assigning one
party the burden of proof and then determining the relevant legal
standard.31 The business judgment rule presumes “that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company.”32 Courts will not second-guess a

26. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977) (“Development, as the
majority stockholder of Magnavox, owed to the minority stockholders of that corporation, a
fiduciary obligation . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 A.2d 969 (1977). Similarly, a majority
shareholder who “exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation” owes
shareholders a fiduciary obligation. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110,
1113 (Del. 1994) (quoting Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344
(Del. 1987)) (emphasis added by Kahn).
27. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106 (Del. 1985) (quoting
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1981)); see also A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers
by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 4, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The general rule,
long established in Delaware and elsewhere, is that controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and minority shareholders.”).
28. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1106 (citing Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 915 (Del.
Ch. 1969)).
29. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995). Historically, only
the duties of loyalty and due care oversaw the parent-minority shareholder relationship. A 1986
amendment to Delaware’s General Corporation Law, however, suggested that directors also
owe shareholders a duty of good faith. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001)
(prohibiting a corporation from limiting a director’s liability in its certificate of incorporation
“for acts or omissions not in good faith”). Cinerama confirmed that directors owe shareholders
all three duties. 663 A.2d at 1164. Even so, directors that violate the duty of good faith are likely
also acting disloyal or not exercising due care.
30. Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1157
(1998).
31. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162.
32. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Delaware’s General Corporation Law
expresses the business judgment rule as: “The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141.
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board decision unless the plaintiff can rebut one of these business
33
judgment rule presumptions.
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., however, the court removed the
business judgment rule from consideration when a controlling
shareholder stands on both sides of a transaction. Instead, such a
34
transaction is subject to “entire fairness” review. By implementing
an entire fairness review of a parent-subsidiary merger, the
Weinberger court necessarily created a conflict with Delaware’s
existing short-form merger statute.35 Specifically, Weinberger’s entire
fairness requires fair dealing for a freeze-out merger, but Delaware’s
short-form merger statute does not require any dealing whatsoever
on the part of the parent. The Delaware Supreme Court resolved this
conflict in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. by exempting shortform mergers from entire fairness review. In doing so, the court held
that appraisal is the exclusive remedy for dissatisfied stockholders,
absent fraud or illegality.36
B. Entire Fairness Review
Entire fairness review stems from the duty of loyalty, which
applies primarily in situations where one party to a transaction could
engage in self-dealing.37 Although a corporation’s board is generally
charged with maximizing shareholder wealth, the board might fail to
maximize shareholder wealth when the interests of the majority
shareholders, who control the board, and the minority shareholders
conflict.38 Consequently, the duty of loyalty and resulting entire
fairness review protect minority shareholders from majority

33. Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections
for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 BUS. LAW. 519,
522−23 (2003).
34. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); accord Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994). In Weinberger, the court removed
the business judgment rule because the rule did not provide minority shareholders any
additional protection given the new entire fairness standard, “the expanded appraisal remedy,”
and “the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion” other relief. 457 A.2d at 715.
35. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2000).
36. Id. at 248.
37. William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 862 (2001).
38. See id. at 875 (“[W]here a majority have personal interests in the transaction that are
adverse to the interest of the shareholders, it cannot be presumed that the board will be
motivated to achieve the highest transaction price the market will permit.”).

071604 HOSSFELD.DOC

2004]

9/17/2004 2:03 PM

TIME TO REFORM APPRAISAL

1343

shareholders who “could unilaterally implement transactions to the
39
detriment of minority shareholders.”
Entire fairness review is Delaware’s most rigorous standard of
40
review. It requires majority shareholders to establish that they dealt
fairly with the minority shareholders and paid a fair price for the
minority shares:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. . . . [T]he test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between
fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a
whole since the question is one of entire fairness. However, in a nonfraudulent transaction we recognize that price may be the
preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the
41
merger.

First, fair dealing “embraces questions of when the transaction
was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
42
stockholders were obtained.” Although fair dealing clearly requires
a parent to act “free of fraud or misrepresentation,” a parent must do
more than just avoid deception to achieve fair dealing.43 The parent
must also “disclose[] all information in [its] possession germane to the
transaction in issue. . . . such as a reasonable shareholder would
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock.”44 For
example, in Weinberger, the court found important both an internal
45
memorandum discussing merger synergies and a report stating that
the freeze-out would be a good investment up to $24 per share
39. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 520. Entire fairness also ensures minority
shareholders a fair valuation of their shares, given “the difficulty of ascertaining, in non-armslength transactions, the price at which the deal would have been effected in the market.” Allen
et al., supra note 37, at 876.
40. See Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 523 (“The entire fairness test has been
consistently referred to as the most exacting standard of review utilized by Delaware courts.”);
Pritchard, supra note 27, at 2 (“[T]he ‘entire fairness’ standard [is] the most demanding regime
in corporate law.”); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.
1989) (describing entire fairness review as “rigorous judicial scrutiny under . . . exacting
standards”).
41. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Note that “where corporate
action has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders . . . the
burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority.” Id.
at 703.
42. Id. at 711.
43. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104–05 (Del. 1985).
44. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
45. Id. at 708.
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46
(instead of the offered $21 per share). As such, the court held that
the parent did not satisfy the fair dealing prong of entire fairness.47
Second, a transaction must satisfy the fair price element of entire
fairness. In Weinberger, the court rejected the traditional “Delaware
48
block” method of valuing shares and instead crafted a more flexible
49
approach modeled after valuation in an appraisal proceeding. Under
the court’s new approach to calculating fair price, a parent must
consider “all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company’s stock.”50 Only “speculative elements” can be
excluded from the fair price calculation.51
The new bifurcated fairness standard established in Weinberger
set the stage for a conflict between the “fair dealing” component of
entire fairness and the summary merger procedure in Delaware’s
short-form merger statute. Under Delaware’s statute, the majority
and minority shareholders do not negotiate a merger agreement,
minority shareholders receive no advance notice, and shareholders do
not vote.52 The court resolved the conflict in Glassman. Looking to
the legislative intent behind the short-form merger statute, the court
concluded that a standard of entire fairness would thwart the
legislature’s goal of establishing a quick freeze-out process for parents
who hold at least 90 percent of a subsidiary.53 Therefore, mergers
under Delaware’s short-form merger statute need not satisfy entire
fairness. Instead, a frozen-out shareholder can only check majority
overreaching through the state’s default appraisal remedy.

46. Id. at 712.
47. Id.
48. Under the Delaware block method, a court assigns weights to a company’s “net asset
value, market price, earnings, and other factors . . . based on the trial court’s intuitive
judgment.” Leo Herzel & Dale E. Colling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out
Mergers After Weinberger v. UOP, 39 BUS. LAW. 1525, 1529 (1984). In Weinberger, the court
rejected the Delaware block method, which it had used for decades, because the method did not
account for “other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community and the
courts.” 457 A.2d at 712.
49. Id. at 712–13.
50. Id. at 711.
51. Id. at 713.
52. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001).
53. Id. at 247−48 (“If . . . [the parent] sets up negotiating committees, hires independent . . .
experts, etc., then it . . . [loses] the very benefit provided by the statute—a simple, fast and
inexpensive process for accomplishing a merger.”).
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C. Appraisal
Appraisal is a statutory remedy by which shareholders who
dissent to a merger can petition Delaware’s Court of Chancery for a
determination of the “fair value” of their shares.54 Essentially,
appraisal provides dissatisfied shareholders with an option to cash-out
without having to demonstrate “illegality, fraud, bad faith or some
other breach of fiduciary duty.”55 The concept of appraisal originated
in the nineteenth century to provide managers with additional
56
flexibility. At that time, corporate law viewed shareholders as
holding vested rights in a corporation, and thus a single shareholder
could veto a merger.57 The growth of American business at the end of
the nineteenth century, however, required a more flexible approach
to mergers, and appraisal “facilitat[ed] desirable corporate changes
[and] provid[ed] liquidity.”58
Since its introduction, Delaware’s appraisal statute has served
three main purposes: (1) “facilitating the market for corporate
control”; (2) “providing liquidity”; and (3) checking majority
shareholder opportunism.59 Today, appraisal’s most important
purpose is checking majority shareholder opportunisma function
previously satisfied by both the concept of fiduciary duty and statutes
limiting corporate power.60 To check majority opportunism
effectively, appraisal must provide minority shareholders with
legitimate access to an adequate price.
1. Appraisal Procedure. Appraisal “is a limited statutory
remedy”61 and is available only in certain transactions, one of which is
a short-form merger.62 In Delaware, qualifying dissatisfied
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2001).
55. In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 340 (Del. Ch. 2000).
56. Id.; Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 10 (1983).
57. Unocal Exploration, 793 A.2d at 339; Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 614–15; see also In
re Paine v. Saulsbury, 166 N.W. 1036 (1918) (refusing to permit a 99 percent shareholder to
dissolve a corporation because the 1 percent minority shareholders did not assent to
dissolution).
58. Thompson, supra note 19, at 3.
59. Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 16
(2000).
60. Thompson, supra note 19, at 4.
61. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296 (Del. 1996).
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2001). Appraisal applies without exception in shortform mergers. Id. § 262(b)(3). However, appraisal is not always available within other categories
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shareholders must follow a complex set of statutory guidelines to
perfect their appraisal rights. Each shareholder seeking appraisal
must comply with these guidelines, making appraisal an “opt-in”
63
remedy. In contrast, other shareholder remedies, such as entire
fairness,
authorize
class
action
litigationan
“opt-out”
remedywhere shareholders are included in the class unless they
remove themselves from the litigation.64
To qualify under Delaware’s appraisal statute, a shareholder
must first hold the corporation’s stock on the date that the
shareholder demands appraisal, and then continuously until the
65
effective date of the merger or consolidation. In a short-form
merger, the shareholder of record will receive an initial notice about
the merger and information about the shareholder’s appraisal rights
either before the merger’s effective date or within ten days
66
thereafter. After the corporation mails the appraisal notice, the
dissatisfied stockholder has twenty days to demand appraisal in
writing from the continuing corporation.67 The demand must
“reasonably inform[] the corporation of the identity of the
stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the
appraisal.”68
After a shareholder demands appraisal, the continuing
corporation must disclose to the shareholder, upon written request,
both the number of shareholders demanding appraisal and the
collective number of shares they hold. The corporation shall mail
of mergers. For example, minority shareholders in a long-form mergera freeze-out merger
where the controlling stockholder owns at least 50.1 percent of each class of stockface a stock
market exemption, which denies them appraisal when shares are publicly traded. Id. §
262(b)(1).
63. Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 194 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that one of the “apparent
inadequacies of the appraisal remedy [is] that [the shareholder] does not get to represent a
class”).
64. See, e.g., Herzel & Colling, supra note 48, at 1526 (describing the availability of class
action litigation in an entire fairness complaint).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a).
66. To determine which stockholders receive notice of the merger and their appraisal
rights, each constituent corporation can set a record date, not more than ten days before mailing
the notice. Id. § 262(d)(2). However, if the corporation mails such notice on or after the
merger’s effective date, the record date will be the effective date. Id. Note that the appraisal
demand procedure is different for mergers subject to a stockholder vote. In such mergers, the
corporation must provide notice to the shareholders at least twenty days before the meeting,
and a shareholder must demand appraisal before the vote. Id. § 262(d)(1). To retain appraisal
rights, the shareholder must not vote for or consent to the merger. Id. § 262(a).
67. Id. § 262(d)(2).
68. Id.
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such disclosure within ten days of either receiving the information
69
request or concluding the appraisal demand period. At the same
time, either the continuing corporation or a stockholder who
complied with the appraisal statute can petition the Delaware Court
of Chancery for a “determination of the value of the stock” within
120 days of the merger’s effective date.70 However, a shareholder has
sixty days from the effective date to withdraw from an appraisal
proceeding and accept the merger terms. Finally, the continuing
corporation must provide the Chancery Court with a duly verified list
71
of the names and addresses of stockholders suing for appraisal.
2. Valuation. After perfecting the right to appraisal, a
shareholder turns to the Court of Chancery for a determination of
each share’s “fair value.”72 Underlying appraisal is the assumption
that dissenting shareholders want to retain their investment in the
73
corporation and would do so absent the freeze-out. As such, an
appraisal proceeding must award dissenting stockholders the fair
value of what the freeze-out took from them. The appraisal statute
does not provide any guidance regarding how to calculate fair value,
and thus courts have developed a valuation technique out of
necessity.74 Weinberger confirmed that the underlying inquiry in fair
value is to determine the stockholder’s “proportionate interest in
75
[the] going concern.” In valuing the company as a going concern, a
court must value the corporation as a whole, rather than merely
76
calculating the value of the minority stock. After establishing the
corporation’s value, the court then awards a stockholder a sum equal
to the stockholder’s pro rata share of the corporation.

69. Id. § 262(e).
70. Id. The stockholder must also serve notice of the appraisal petition on the continuing
corporation. Id.
71. Id. § 262(f).
72. Id. § 262(h).
73. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996); see also Campbell,
supra note 10, at 118–19 (“Stockholders invest in anticipation of participating in the value that a
corporation generates as a going concern.”).
74. John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority
Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1260 (1999).
75. Cede, 684 A.2d at 298; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
76. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); see also Cede, 684 A.2d
at 298 (“The dissenting shareholder’s proportionate interest is determined only after the
company has been valued as an operating entity on the date of the merger.”).
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When determining the fair value of the going concern, a court
should consider: “all factors and elements which reasonably might
enter into the fixing of value. . . . [including] market value, asset
value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise, and
77
any other facts.” Within this formula, fair value must also consider
externalities that might have depressed the current market, cyclical
earning cycles, and whether management timed the freeze-out in
anticipation of a positive development. Appraisal only excludes
“speculative elements of value,” but this is “a very narrow exception,”
and not meant to exclude statistical techniques as a method of
proving future value.78 Nevertheless, fair value does not include any
synergy or gain the corporation expects from the merger.79
D. Majority Stockholder’s Duty to Disclose
Although a parent may conduct a short-form merger without
following the procedures that satisfy entire fairness, it must still
80
satisfy the duty of full disclosure. After a parent commences a shortform merger, minority shareholders are left with two options: accept
the merger terms and accompanying price for their holdings, or file an
appraisal action. To facilitate this decision, the majority shareholder
must provide minority shareholders with “all the factual information
that is material to that decision.”81 A given fact is material, and thus
must be disclosed, if there is “a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable stockholder as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’
of information made available.”82

77. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del.
1950)).
78. Id.
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001).
80. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001); Skeen v. Jo-Ann
Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1171 (Del. 2000).
81. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248.
82. Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1172 (quoting Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d
135, 142 (Del. 1997)). In disclosing all material information, the majority shareholder must
“communicate honestly,” and “comply[] with their ever-present duties of due care, good faith
and loyalty.” In re Siliconix Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *36
(June 19, 2001).
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For example, a large difference in the merger price and a stock’s
83
book price provides new information and is material. However,
unless significantly different from previously disclosed information,
courts have not required the disclosure of management performance
projections, more recent financial statements, or the prices a
corporation discussed for its possible sale.84 Such information might
85
be “helpful” to stockholders, but is not material. Majority
shareholders who violate their duty to disclose expose themselves to
an action for the breach of their fiduciary duties.86
II. AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
When Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. ended entire
fairness review of short-form mergers, it left appraisal as the sole
safeguard against majority opportunism.87 One reason for elevating
appraisal was to facilitate the market for corporate controlthe first
of appraisal’s three purposesin the context of efficient short-form
mergers.88 Nevertheless, because appraisal is now a minority
shareholder’s sole remedy in a short-form merger, it is critical that
appraisal both provides minority shareholders with legitimate access
to an adequate price and checks majority opportunism. Without such
access and protection, majority shareholders could freeze out
minority shareholders for minimal consideration, leaving injured
shareholders without a remedy at law.
Generally, entire fairness provides a better remedy for
dissatisfied minority shareholders than appraisal. The differences
between the two remedies highlight appraisal’s inadequacy as a
protection against majority opportunism. If appraisal were adequate,
courts or the legislature would have extended its exclusivity to other
transactions, such as long-form mergers.89 However, by developing
83. See Seagraves v. Urstadt Prop. Co., No. 10307, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155, at *15 (Dec.
4, 1989) (suggesting that a disparity between the merger price of $12.50 and book value of
$25.00 would be material, even though a $3.00 difference would not be).
84. Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1173.
85. Id. at 1174.
86. E.g., Seagraves, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155, at *13.
87. Neither shareholder approval nor common law fiduciary duties adequately protect
minority shareholders. For a discussion of the legal safeguards that protect minority
shareholders from majority opportunism, see supra notes 11−17 and accompanying text.
88. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (recognizing
that the short-form merger statute provides “a simple, fast and inexpensive process for
accomplishing a merger”).
89. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 551.
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two standards of protectionappraisal for short-form mergers and
entire fairness review with appraisal for long-form mergersthe
Delaware courts and legislature recognize that it is not appropriate to
rely solely on appraisal in all situations. This Part first argues that in
the context of short-form mergers, appraisal and entire fairness are
substantively identical. Section B then demonstrates that, despite the
substantive similarities between the two remedies, their procedural
differences render appraisal an inadequate protection against
majority opportunism.
A. Appraisal as an Exclusive Remedy in a Short-Form Merger
Appraisal should be the exclusive remedy for dissatisfied
shareholders in a short-form merger because it facilitates the market
for corporate control. Because the Delaware legislature created a
summary process for short-form mergerseliminating procedures
that a board must follow in other transactionsquestions embraced
by the fair dealing inquiry of entire fairness are irrelevant.
Dissatisfied minority shareholders in a short-form merger only
complain about price. As such, appraisal will serve as the substantive
equivalent of entire fairness review if it provides minority
shareholders with the same payout.90 In other words, fair value in
appraisal must equal fair price in entire fairness.
Even though appraisal calculates the “fair value” of minority
shares and entire fairness examines “fair price,” the two procedures
91
employ similar valuation techniques. Both evaluate the firm as “a
going concern,” and both utilize a similar laundry list of relevant
92
financial considerations. In addition, Delaware courts often consult
90. See In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 338 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(“Put simply, long-form and short-form mergers should be subject to a different set of rules
because one form of transaction requires the subsidiary board’s participation and assent while
the other does not.”), aff’d, Glassman, 777 A.2d 242.
91. Rabkin v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990);
Andrew G.T. Moore, The ‘Interested’ Director of Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 674,
676 (1979); Lucian A. Bebchuck & Marcel Kahan, The “Lemons Effect” in Corporate FreezeOuts 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6938, 1999). But see Campbell,
supra note 10, at 111 (“Courts generally have determined that the measure of fair price is
different from the measure of fair value.”).
92. “[Fair price] include[s] all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s
stock.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). “[V]alue under the appraisal
statute” is “the true or intrinsic value of his stock. . . . [which factors in] market value, asset
value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts . . .” Id. at
713 (quoting Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)).
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appraisal cases when deciding whether a price is fair, reasoning that a
93
fair value in appraisal will be a fair price in entire fairness. The
major difference between entire fairness and appraisal is that entire
94
fairness can award rescissory damages. In contrast, undoing a shortform merger is rarely appropriate, and misconduct supporting such a
remedy in a short-form merger would likely open up a fiduciary duty
claim, for which rescissory damages are also available.95
Establishing appraisal as an exclusive remedy would also benefit
majority shareholders by providing an inexpensive procedure for
96
eliminating minority shareholders. Appraisal litigation is less
expensive than other forms of litigation challenging mergers, such as
97
entire fairness. Benefiting controlling shareholders alone, however,
is not a sufficient justification for making appraisal exclusive because
the controlling shareholder decides whether to undertake the
transaction. Nevertheless, because appraisal yields the same payout as
entire fairness, the minority shareholder, while not better off, is not
worse off under an exclusive appraisal approach. Therefore,
exclusivity will increase social value by lowering transaction costs
while compensating the minority shareholders under the same
scheme.

93. See, e.g., Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991) (“If a
particular merger price would not be ‘entirely fair’ in an equitable action claiming breach of
fiduciary duty, no different result should obtain in an appraisal, where the issue is whether that
identical merger price constitutes ‘fair value.’” (quoting Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No.
CIV.A.7499, 1989 WL 17438, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989))); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564
A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (“The fairness concept has been said to implicate two
considerations: fair dealing and fair price.”); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845
(Del. 1987) (stating that in an entire fairness case, the concept of fair price “flows from” the
requirements of Delaware’s appraisal statute).
94. Compare Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) (“The
Chancellor may incorporate elements of rescissory damages into his determination of fair price,
if he considers such elements: (1) susceptible to proof; and (2) appropriate under the
circumstances.”), with Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962) (“[I]t is
difficult to imagine a case under the short [-form] merger statute in which there could be such
actual fraud as would entitle a minority to set aside the merger.”).
95. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714:
The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly
where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or
gross and palpable overreaching are involved. Under such circumstances, the
Chancellor’s powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary
relief as may be appropriate, including rescissory damages.
(citation omitted).
96. Thomas, supra note 59, at 17.
97. Id. at 17–18.
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B. Problems with Abandoning Entire Fairness for Appraisal
Even though appraisal facilitates the market for corporate
control in short-form mergers, it must also fulfill its most important
purposechecking majority shareholder opportunism.98 To check
majority opportunism effectively, appraisal should provide minority
shareholders with a “reasonably attractive alternative” to accepting
the terms of the merger.99 By doing so, the threat of appraisal will
force majority shareholders to pay a just price for the minority shares.
In theory, such an appraisal remedy will protect minority
shareholders from majority overreaching. In practice, however, “the
appraisal remedy is replete with shortcomings and therefore fails to
protect adequately minority shareholders from majoritarian abuse.”100
The procedural differences between entire fairness and appraisal
illustrate why the current appraisal remedy fails in practice.
First, entire fairness is an opt-out remedy, while shareholders
must opt in if they want to seek appraisal. Shareholders usually bring
fairness claims as a class action.101 Under the class action format,
named plaintiffs can be “small stockholder[s] who [have] a very slight
interest in the matter.” Absent the favorable class action treatment, it
would be uneconomical for such stockholders to challenge the
transaction.102 The most significant economic incentive for bringing
these class actions is that a successful plaintiff can petition the court
103
for attorneys’ fees and expert witness costs. Thus, the class action
format and resulting cost-savings benefits provide the plaintiffs’ bar
with an added incentive to accept fairness cases, even when the claim
presents only minimal damages.104
In contrast, the opt-in, non-class action structure of an appraisal
proceeding makes it difficult for owners of a small amount of stock to

98. Thompson, supra note 19, at 4.
99. See Weiss, supra note 56, at 21 (“The argument in favor of making appraisal the
exclusive remedy holds up, however, only if appraisal presents a dissatisfied minority
shareholder with a reasonably attractive alternative . . . .”).
100. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 546.
101. Herzel & Colling, supra note 48, at 1526.
102. Id.
103. Aronstam et al., supra note 33, at 546−47; see also Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 194
(Del. Ch. 2000) (“[T]he appraisal action will not involve a determination that there was a
fiduciary breach and the concomitant possibility for an award of attorneys’ fees against the
defendants.”).
104. Andra, 772 A.2d at 194. In Andra, Vice Chancellor Strine named the cost-savings
benefits of class action lawsuits “Litigation Cost Benefits.” Id.
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105
challenge a freeze-out valuation. Each party to an appraisal
proceeding bears its own litigation expenses, including both
attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees.106 Dissatisfied minority
shareholders must not only offset any gain by such expenses, but must
also advance large sums to both their attorneys and experts. Without
the possibility of a successful litigant obtaining any of these costsavings benefits, few members of the plaintiffs’ bar would be willing
to undertake appraisal challenges on a contingency basis.107 Making
matters worse, few shareholders perfect their appraisal rights,
reducing the possibility that such claimants will be able to spread the
extensive cost of litigation over enough appraised shares to justify the
appraisal proceeding.108 Still, courts do have the ability to spread the
costs of the proceedingexcluding attorneys’ or expert witness
109
feesamong “the parties as the Court deems equitable.”
Second, compared to the more generalized nature of a fairness
claim, appraisal is procedurally complex, requiring that each
shareholder complete multiple steps to perfect the right to
110
These procedures drag out the average appraisal
appraisal.
proceeding to 727 days,111 which is critical because dissenting
shareholders receive no compensation for their shares until after the
112
Not only must challenging
appraisal proceeding concludes.
shareholders advance fees to lawyers and experts, but they must also
hold an illiquid claim for almost two years, forgoing investment in
other promising opportunities that may arise in the interim.113

105. Coffee, supra note 13, at 364; Herzel & Colling, supra note 48, at 1530.
106. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996); Thomas, supra note 59,
at 15.
107. Weiss, supra note 56, at 21–22; see also Andra, 772 A.2d at 194 (recognizing that it is
“much less attractive” for attorneys to represent a small block of shares in an appraisal
proceeding than to represent most or all the company’s shareholders in a class action
proceeding).
108. Coffee, supra note 13, at 412; Marc I. Steinberg, Short-Form Mergers in Delaware, 27
DEL. J. CORP. L. 489, 492 (2002); Thomas, supra note 59, at 27. If a challenging stockholder
obtains an appraisal award, the court may divide all or a portion of the appraisal expenses,
including attorney and expert fees, on a pro rata basis against the value of shares entitled to
appraisal. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (2001).
109. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j).
110. Id. § 262(g). For a description of the steps Delaware requires to perfect appraisal, see
supra Part I.C.1.
111. Thomas, supra note 59, at 22.
112. Weiss, supra note 56, at 55 n.345.
113. See Thomas, supra note 59, at 29 (recognizing that the challenging shareholder’s
investment is illiquid during an appraisal action); Alexander Khutorsky, Note, Coming in From
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Additionally, the defendant corporation may argue, and the court
may hold, that the fair value of the shares is actually less than the
114
price the corporation originally offered. Even if a challenging
stockholder receives a favorable appraisal, the court can only
reimburse the shareholder for the delayed compensation at the legal
rate of interest.115 There is even uncertainty over whether the interest
should be calculated as simple or compound, although courts seem to
116
be moving toward awarding compound interest. Compound interest
is more likely when the parent did not initially value the shares in
117
good faith.
III. MINORITY DISCOUNTS
The procedural inadequacy of Delaware’s appraisal remedy,
which leaves shareholders unprotected against the risk of majority
overreaching, suggests the possibility that minority shareholders
account for the risk of an unfair freeze-out ex ante, when pricing the
corporation’s stock.118 The basic premise behind ex ante pricingand
the consequent “minority discount”is an efficient capital market. In

the Cold: Reforming Shareholders’ Appraisal Rights in Freeze-Out Transactions, 1997 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 133, 149 (“[T]he problems of illiquidity and the time value of money loom large.
Appraisal statutes generally allow corporations to withhold payment until a determination is
made by the court, a period which can last a year or more.”).
114. Weiss, supra note 56, at 55 n.345.
115. Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Int’l, 753 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. Ch. 1999).
116. See ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 926 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“It is simply not
credible in today’s financial markets that a person sophisticated enough to perfect his or her
appraisal rights would be unsophisticated enough to make an investment at simple
interest . . . .”); Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 710 n.517 (“The award of simple interest penalizes
dissenting shareholders and does not accord with economic realities.”). Contra Thompson,
supra note 19, at 41–42 (“Interest payments have become common only in recent years, and
Delaware still adheres to a standard practice of paying simple rather than compound
interest . . . .”).
117. Borruso, 753 A.2d at 461 (awarding compound interest after “not[ing] that [the
corporation] did not make a good faith effort to value [the minorities’ stock] in the merger”).
118. See Coates, supra note 74, at 1298 (arguing that investors pass costs back to the firm by
way of an increased cost of capital).
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such a market, prices will reflect all available information, including
appraisal’s inability to protect minority shareholders.120
Shares of stock trade at different prices in an efficient market
depending on whether a particular share belongs to the control or
121
minority block. In other words, noncontrolling shares are subject to
a minority discount, “an adjustment downward from some reference
122
123
value, reflecting [minority risks].” Such premiums are “well
124
known and well documented,” and the corresponding minority
125
discounts can be up to 35 percent or more of the reference value.
Professor John Coates examines the source of these control
premiums (or discounts) in the context of change of control
transactions and identifies three main components: (1) synergy value,
(2) pure control value, and (3) expropriation value.126
Synergy value represents the gain possible from a
transactionessentially, the amount by which the whole is more
127
valuable than the sum of the two parts. Synergies derive from
numerous sources, such as operating economies achieved through the
elimination of duplicated functions, tax savings, stock market or
financial benefits,128 and reduced agency costs.129 Recent regulation by
both the Securities and Exchange Commission and national
exchanges has rendered these synergy gains even more valuable, as

119. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970); see Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1240−41 (1990) (“Efficient market
theory predicts that in a well-developed securities market, publicly available information
relevant to stock values is so quickly reflected in market prices that, as a general matter,
investors cannot expect to profit from trading on such information.”).
120. Kimble C. Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority
Shareholders in the Context of Going-Private Transactions: The Case for Obligating Directors to
Express a Valuation Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers after Siliconix, Aquila and Pure
Resources, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 196−97.
121. Coates, supra note 74, at 1262.
122. “Reference values include comparable company market value, market value, asset
value, liquidation value, replacement value, and earnings or going concern value.” Id. at 1263
n.38.
123. Id. at 1263.
124. Id. at 1273.
125. Id. at 1254.
126. Id. at 1274.
127. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698, 706 (1982).
128. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 11, at 308.
129. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 127, at 723.
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corporations save executive time, legal expenses, accounting costs,
130
and filing fees by merging or going private.
Next, pure control value represents the benefits of holding a
controlling interest in a corporation under a system of majority-rule
131
governance. These benefits include “such things as the certainty of
being able to direct operations, obtain further (potential) synergies,
freeze out the minority shareholders, and choose the time for payouts
through dividends, liquidation, or recapitalization.”132 Many of the
pure control benefits stem from the fact that controlling shareholders
elect and have influence over the board of directors and, through the
board, management.133 Given the ability to make corporate decisions
and the reduced uncertainty that stems from making corporate
decisions, controlling a corporation is a valuable asset in and of
itself.134
Finally, while pure control value involves the legitimate (and
expected) benefits of control in a majority-rule system, expropriation
value arises from majority opportunism. The expropriation value of
the control premium derives from the majority’s “ability to
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders through fraud, theft,
or breach of fiduciary duties, such as freeze-outs at a clearly unfair
price.”135 By failing to provide an adequate remedy for unfair freezeouts, appraisal expands the expropriation element of the control
premium.
Assuming an efficient market, minority shareholders will return
the increase in expropriation value to their majority shareholders by
136
way of a lower ex ante stock price. Such reduced stock prices
increase the majority’s cost of capital;137 however, firms accept this

130. Cannon, supra note 120, at 206−12.
131. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994)
(listing examples of the “fundamental corporate changes” that majority shareholders can
undertake through their power of majority-vote governance).
132. Coates, supra note 74, at 1277.
133. See Cannon, supra note 120, at 194 (“Controlling shareholders often have significant
influence over the board of directors as well as over management . . . .”).
134. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112 (1965) (arguing that “control of corporations may constitute a valuable asset; that this
asset exists independent of any interest in either economies of scale or monopoly profits; [and]
that an active market for corporate control exists”).
135. Coates, supra note 74, at 1275.
136. Id. at 1298.
137. Id.; see Cannon, supra note 120, at 196−97 (“This phenomenon will initiate a cycle in
which the value of the shares in companies controlled by . . . majority shareholders will become
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138
cost because of their need for liquidity. Although the control
premium (minority discount) exists in the financial markets,
Delaware rejects any minority discount analysis when valuing
shares.139

IV. REFORMING APPRAISAL TO ACHIEVE A
PARETO OPTIMAL OUTCOME
As currently used in Delaware, the appraisal remedy only
achieves one of its three goals: it facilitates the market for corporate
control, but it neither provides minority shareholders adequate
liquidity nor checks majority shareholder opportunism. Appraisal
facilitates the market for corporate control by giving majority
shareholders almost unlimited discretion to freeze out their minority
counterparts. However, appraisal’s procedural limitations deny
shareholders liquidity unless they accept a potentially unfair merger
price. Appraisal’s procedural limitations also permit majority
shareholder opportunism because few shareholders are able to
challenge an unfair freeze-out price.140 Given that minority
shareholders bargain away part of appraisal’s shortcomings through
the minority discount, majority shareholders share the loss by paying
a premium when raising capital.141
Appraisal should be reformed to realign the remedy with its
traditional goals. When Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp.
established appraisal as a dissatisfied shareholder’s sole remedy
142
following a short-form merger, it correctly identified the high value
of short-form mergers and the need for a quick and inexpensive
shareholder remedy. However, the court should have appreciated
appraisal’s current flaws and crafted an alternative appraisal remedy
modeled off Pareto concepts. Section A sketches out the benefits of
developing a Pareto remedy for appraisal’s shortcomings. Then,
Section B proposes specific appraisal reforms that implement the
theoretical outline of a Pareto optimal appraisal remedy. Section C
ever more depressed due to the perceived risk that minority shareholders will be eliminated at
an unfair price through a related-party tender offer.”).
138. Coates, supra note 74, at 1262 n.35 (acknowledging that commentators have identified
“other types of discounts relevant to fair value,” including “illiquidity discount[s]”).
139. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989); Coffee, supra note 13,
at 367; Thomas, supra note 59, at 15.
140. See supra Part II.B.
141. See supra Part III.
142. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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briefly examines valuation, before Section D argues that reforming
appraisal will not chill efficient mergers.
A. Pareto Theory of Reforming Appraisal
In general, a Pareto optimal outcome is an allocation of goods
where it is impossible to make one person better off (under a
different allocation) without making at least one other person worse
143
off. A typical Pareto situation, applied to a short-form merger, is
diagramed as:

The horizontal axis represents the minority shareholders’ ex ante
share price, the price the minority initially paid for their shares. The
vertical axis depicts the inadequacy of the appraisal remedy.
Following the arrows on the axes, minority shareholders will pay less
for their stock as appraisal becomes increasingly inadequate.
Correspondingly, majority shareholders receive less money for selling
stock as appraisal becomes more inadequate because they pay a
higher cost of capital.
Realizing that ex ante share price and appraisal’s inadequacy
have an inverse relationship, both majority and minority shareholders
143.

FRANK, supra note 22, at 559.
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select combinations of the two goods that are advantageous to their
respective positions. These combinations are called indifference
curves, and simply represent a sliding scale of the amount each party
will pay/receive in the initial sale of stock given the adequacy of the
appraisal remedy. The contract curve represents Pareto optimal
outcomes, and allocations on the curve are desirable because at these
points neither party can improve its situation without harming the
other side.
Currently, the parent and minority “contract” where their
indifference curves intersect at Point A. Point A is not Pareto
optimal. To reach a Pareto preferred or optimal point, the parent, the
minority, or both must adjust its current indifference curve. By
employing an externalitya modified Delaware appraisal statute or
judicial doctrinethe parent and/or minority shareholders can move
off their indifference curve and contract for a more efficient
allocation of goods. To be successful, this externality should modify
the appraisal perfecting process, providing minority shareholders with
the liquidity and the ability to check majority overreaching that they
currently lack. Minority shareholders will then remit a portion of
these benefits to the parent through a smaller minority discountin
144
other words, a lower cost of capital.
The current Pareto inefficient allocation arose from the holding
in Glassman. Before Glassman, majority shareholders were uncertain
about the level of fairness they owed minority shareholders in a shortform merger. For example, majority shareholders would appoint
special negotiating committees, bring in outside advisors to simulate
an arms-length negotiation, and take other steps consistent with a
145
regular entire fairness review. The court recognized that such
procedures would be inconsistent with an efficient and inexpensive
process and granted majority shareholders the right to follow
Delaware’s statutory summary process.146 In doing so, the court
benefited the majority, but made the minority position worse by
removing protections against illiquidity and majority overreaching.
The Glassman court left minority shareholders with an appraisal
procedure that delivers the same price as entire fairness and should
be adequate in theory, but that proves inadequate in practice due to

144.
145.
146.

POSNER, supra note 23, at 458.
E.g., Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001).
Id. at 247−48.
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147
its numerous procedural disadvantages. Similar to a law without
enforcement, a remedy without access is ineffective.148

B. Changing the Method of Appraisal
In order to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome, the procedure for
seeking appraisal should change. Appraisal reform should “balanc[e]
the relative dangers of oppression by the majority and harassment by
the minority.”149 Because appraisal currently fails to check majority
oppression, any reform should elevate small shareholders to the level
where appraisal offers them an effective remedy.
First, Delaware should implement a summary process that
enables dissatisfied minority shareholders to obtain a judgment
sooner than the 727-day average that currently scares shareholders
150
into accepting merger terms.
Second, Delaware’s appraisal law should provide challenging
shareholders with some liquidity by following the intent of the Model
151
Business Corporation Act’s (MBCA) payout provision. The MBCA
payout provision provides that a parent must compensate a minority
shareholder with what the parent calculates as a “fair value” for the
minority’s shares within thirty days of receiving the shareholder’s
demand for appraisal.152 While the MBCA facilitates appraisal actions
by providing some instant liquidity, it goes too far in protecting
minority shareholders by awarding a price that might exceed the
appraised value of the shares. In an appraisal hearing, courts are free
to appraise shares for less than the merger pricethe price the parent
initially determined was a fair value.
To incorporate the benefits of the MBCA provision while
avoiding its disadvantages, a better approach is to require parents to
pay challenging shareholders a sum equal to the market price of the
147. See supra Part II.B.
148. See Franco Modigliani & Enrico Perotti, Protection of Minority Interest and the
Development of Security Markets, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 519, 520 (1997) (“It is
important to realize that legal rules alone are not sufficient to create a favorable legal
framework; their proper enforcement is just as important.”).
149. James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder’s Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1216–17 (1964).
150. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
151. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24 (1992).
152. Id. Note that the “fair value” price under this provision is not necessarily the same as
the merger price. Parents have an incentive to pay the merger price, however, because if parents
regularly paid higher prices, minority shareholders would seldom accept the initial merger price
but instead hope for a quick settlement at a higher price.
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shares immediately prior to the merger. While market price is an
unreliable indicator of value, particularly in the presence of a
153
controlling block of stock that lowers trading volume and liquidity,
it still provides minority shareholders with some value for their
shares. Also, courts are unlikely to appraise minority shares for less
than their market value prior to the freeze-out, so the risk of
overpayment is minimized. The majority shareholder can then remit
any additional court-appraised value to the minority shareholder,
with interest.154
Appraisal should also be a less expensive process for minority
shareholders. The most important reform in this regard is to grant
courts the discretion to award successful shareholders reasonable
attorneys’ fees (and expert fees155). Essentially, appraisal should apply
the test courts use when awarding compound interest over simple
interest: award attorneys’ fees when the parent fails to act in good
faith.156 Courts should use their equitable authority to grant attorneys’
fees when parents have severely understated fair value. To limit
frivolous lawsuits, however, courts should not award attorneys’ fees
when minority shareholders lack a good faith basis for challenging the
merger price.
While appraisal should be more accessible to minority
shareholders, courts should retain appraisal’s opt-in requirement and
the initial procedures for perfecting appraisal rights. Unlike a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty, an appraisal action does not guarantee
that the appraised price will exceed the merger price. Though this risk
is necessary to prevent every minority shareholder from challenging a
freeze-outessentially, shareholders would have nothing to lose by
an appraisal challengemany shareholders prefer to forgo the risk
and instead accept the merger price.157 To allow these shareholders to
153. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 640.
154. Courts should end the uncertainty surrounding whether simple or compound interest is
the correct method for compensating victorious shareholders for the time value of money and
award minority shareholders compound interest for any amount by which the appraised value
exceeds the market price payout. It is unreasonable to assume that individual stockholders and
institutional investors lack the financial knowledge to seek out compound interest returns.
155. Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992) (“It is frequently the case in
appraisal proceedings that valuation disputes become a battle of experts.”).
156. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
157. In fact, courts should encourage majority shareholders to argue that the merger price
exceeded a fair price. While appraisal should allow minority shareholders to sue when parent
corporations or majority shareholders treat them unfairly, appraisal should also discourage suits
when the merger price is fair. When shareholders blindly seek appraisal after a freeze-out, they
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make an informed decision about the risk of challenging a freeze-out
price, Delaware should continue to require strict disclosures in freeze158
out mergers.
C. Valuation in Appraisal
When minority shareholders make it to the appraisal court,
Delaware should adhere to Weinberger’s flexible valuation standard
of using techniques widely accepted in the financial community.159
Shareholders will likely rely on similar valuation techniques when
they enter financial markets, and thus appraisal should compensate
minority shareholders for the expectations they develop. Currently,
the discounted cash flows (DCF) method of valuation is the most
accurate valuation technique employed in the financial market.160
Under DCF, an appraiser must estimate the continuing company’s
future cash flows and then discount the cash flows to their present
value using the corporation’s weighted average cost of capital
(WAAC).161
The underlying inquiry in valuing shares in a freeze-out is to
determine the stockholder’s “proportionate interest in the going
concern.”162 Although focusing on market price might seem natural
during valuation,163 appraisal recognizes correctly that market price is
not reliable in freeze-out mergers because the small market for
minority shares does not permit a sufficient volume of trading to
achieve an accurate price.164 Furthermore, freeze-outs often occur
will increase the transaction costs of the merger and thus could frustrate socially beneficial
mergers.
158. See supra Part I.D.
159. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
160. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 627.
161. STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 372−73 (5th ed. 1999). See generally
Steven N. Kaplan & Richard Ruback, The Market Price of Cash Flow Forecasts: Discounted
Cash Flows v. the Method of Comparables, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1996, at 45. WAAC
accounts for the corporation’s capital structure, including the cost of both equity and debt.
ROSS, supra, at 372−73. See generally F. Modigliani & M.H. Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 276–93 (1958).
162. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
163. Bebchuck & Kahan, supra note 91, at 4.
164. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 640; see also Modigliani & Perotti, supra note 148, at 522
(“Low demand by small investors may cause thin trading.”). In contrast, the stock market
exception discussed in supra note 62 describes a situation when markets can support valuation
based on market price. “The rationale of the stock market exception is that appraisal is an
unnecessary protection for investors whose shares are traded in such well-organized, and
presumably efficient, markets.” Stout, supra note 119, at 1286. It is important to note that the
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when the market price is below a firm’s going-concern value as
majority shareholders can use their private information to time
165
freeze-outs. DCF accounts for both problems by focusing on the
going concern’s future cash flows, not current stock price.
DCF has several limitations, however, which courts should
control for during an appraisal valuation. First, calculating future cash
flows might be difficult because the majority shareholder controls the
166
financial information. Required disclosure should alleviate much of
this insider problem, but managers remain in the best position to
estimate future cash flows. Second, DCF is of limited use with
emerging corporations, which are frequent targets in freeze-out
167
mergers. Estimating the future cash flows of these companies will
likely either grossly understate or overstate the corporation’s value.
Finally, DCF requires accurate estimates for each variable, and even
slight variations in cash flows, the discount rate, or the growth rate
will dramatically swing the corporation’s present value.
D. Effect on Short-Form Mergers
Finally, any appraisal reform should be tested against the
criticism that it will impose costs on majority shareholders that are so
large as to prevent majority shareholders from undertaking socially
beneficial transactions.168 Any such chilling, however, would occur
only for transactions on the margin because high value deals will close
169
regardless of the protections afforded to minority shareholders.
Nevertheless, under the proposed Pareto approach to reforming
appraisal in short-form mergers, the improved minority protections
legislature excluded short-form mergers from the stock market exception. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262(b)(3) (2001).
165. James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder’s Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1203−04 (1964).
166. Wertheimer, supra note 21, at 629–30.
167. See O’NEAL, supra note 25, at 4 (“Squeeze-outs are most often effected in relatively
small corporations . . . .”).
168. See Jon E. Abramczyk et al., Going-Private “Dilemma”?Not in Delaware, 58 BUS.
LAW. 1351, 1365 (2003) (arguing that a proposal to hold a “limited fairness” hearing after
freeze-out mergers would “impose costs so great on the majority stockholders that such
stockholders would likely not propose going-private transactions in the first place”).
169. Cf. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243−44 (Del. 2001)
(recognizing that Unocal Corporation implemented procedures that it thought would satisfy
entire fairness when freezing out the minority shareholders of its subsidiary, Unocal
Exploration Corporation); Cannon, supra note 120, at 201 (describing Kohlberg, Kravis &
Robert’s acquisition of Duracell, and how a $350 million original investment to take Duracell
private returned $4.22 billion).
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will not chill beneficial transactions. Majority shareholders can
continue to employ Delaware’s short-form merger statute, while
avoiding an increase in their cost of capital from the risk of
expropriation or overreaching.
Reforming appraisal for freeze-out mergers also raises fewer
concerns than in some of the other contexts in which appraisal
applies. Most acquiring groups must make a substantial investment in
170
research before identifying possible target groups and corporations.
Such costs are irrelevant in freeze-out mergers because the acquiring
group consists of insiders who “are inherently in possession of
nonpublic information about their own company.”171 Similarly,
controlling shareholders will require few resources to transition
because they already control the corporation. Therefore, many of the
traditional concerns about chilling efficient mergers do not apply in
the context of freeze-out mergers.
CONCLUSION
In Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., the court significantly
weakened the position of minority shareholders in a short-form
merger by declaring that appraisal, a currently ineffective remedy, is
the sole remedy they may seek absent fraud or illegality. Appraisal is
ineffective because its complicated procedures and great expense
render it unavailable for all but the largest minority shareholders.
Most shareholders are simply better off accepting the merger terms,
which usually impart some premium over the current market price,
and then reinvesting the payout in a new going concern.
Both minority and majority shareholders are aware of the
comparative advantage majority shareholders hold. Through efficient
markets, however, minority shareholders partially offset the
competitive advantage with an ex ante minority discount. Although
the minority discount serves control and liquidity purposes, it also
includes a portion of the synergies that minority shareholders
relinquish during appraisal. Given this interconnection, both
shareholders and parents would be better off reducing the transaction
costs of appraisal.
170. Peter Holl, Control Type and the Market for Corporate Control in Large U.S.
Corporations, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 259 (1977), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 205–11 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980);
Coffee, supra note 13, at 410–11.
171. Coffee, supra note 13, at 410.
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Delaware should borrow from the concept of Pareto optimality
and reform its appraisal statute to reduce the transaction costs
involved in an appraisal action. Doing this will enable shareholders to
bring expedient appraisal actions and receive fair value for their
shares. If Delaware is able to make appraisal a viable alternative to
simply accepting an unfair freeze-out price, minority shareholders will
finally realize their proportionate share of merger synergies.
Consequently, investors looking to buy minority interests in
corporations will not price as large a minority discount into their
initial purchase price, and a higher purchase price will translate to a
lower cost of capital for the corporation. It is at this point, Pareto
optimality, that parent corporations have the ability to execute
quickly freeze-out mergers, shareholders receive fair value through
an adequate remedy, and the public benefits through increased
investment and wealth-creating mergers.

